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2.1  Introduction 
Adjustments of nominal exchange rates provide a mechanism through 
which the general level of prices in  one country may be modified  to 
correspond to the general level of prices in other countries. This mech- 
anism thus serves to neutralize the real effects of differential monetary 
disturbances in different countries. In contrast, the principal effect of 
commercial  policies  is  on the  relative  prices  of  goods entering  into 
international trade and hence on the allocation of real resources among 
sectors of the economy. Despite this fundamental difference between 
the prime mission and basic purpose of nominal exchange rate adjust- 
ments and commercial policies,  it has long been recognized that ex- 
change  rates can, in  some circumstances, be  manipulated  to affect 
relative commodity prices and thereby replicate many of the effects of 
commercial policies. 
In  the past, observers have  recognized  three  important  channels 
through which policies designed to modify exchange rates can influence 
relative  commodity  prices  in  a  manner similar to that  achieved  by 
commercial policies. First, systems of multiple exchange rates in which 
different nominal exchange rates are applied to different categories of 
imports and exports are known to be essentially equivalent to a system 
of import and export taxes and subsidies. (The standard reference on 
this  subject  is  Bhagwati  1968; see also  Corden  1971, chap. 4; and 
Corden 1967.) Second, in the presence of rigidities or stickiness in the 
nominal prices of domestic goods or  of goods entering into international 
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trade, or in  the wages of factors employed in producing these goods, 
movements  in the nominal  exchange rate, even under a unified  ex- 
change rate regime, clearly have the capacity to affect relative com- 
modity prices and influence the allocation of resources. This assump- 
tion is explicitly or implicitly employed in many of the earlier analyses 
of  the  effects  of  devaluation, including the  classic contributions of 
Meade (1951), Harberger (1950), Machlup (1959, and Tsiang (1961). It 
is also the fundamental source of the real effects of nominal exchange 
rate changes in the more recent analyses that assume only temporary 
stickiness of nominal wages or prices, such as Dornbusch (1976; 19801, 
Buiter and Miller (1983), and Mussa (1977; 1982a; 1984). Third, even 
with a unified exchange rate and without nominal price or wage stick- 
iness, government policies that affect either the distribution of expen- 
ditures among goods or the level of spending relative to income are 
known to have some capacity to influence the “real exchange rate,” 
defined as the relative price of one country’s output in terms of another 
country’s output. This idea is clearly present in the work of Meade 
(1951), Pearce (1961), and Corden (1960), as well as in more recent 
contributions, such as Dornbusch (1975) and the literature on the “Dutch 
disease.” 
The purpose of this paper is to explore in a more explicitly dynamic 
framework the third of  these channels. Section 2.2 describes and dis- 
cusses the model of the real sector of the economy that is used as the 
basis for this exploration. This model is consistent both with the two- 
country, two-commodity model of real trade theory (modified to allow 
for differences between spending and income in the home country) and 
with the  “dependent  economy”  model. The basic equations of  this 
model are specified in a log-linear form that permits easier manipulation 
of the dynamic version of the model in the subsequent sections of the 
paper. In this model, as in the standard trade theory model, the equi- 
librium value of the (logarithm of the) relative price of domestic goods 
in terms of foreign goods is consistent with any given value of the trade 
balance of  the home country, for given values of  the exogenous pa- 
rameters and policy variables that influence domestic and foreign de- 
mand for domestic and foreign goods. This relative price is identified 
with the concept of the real exchange rate. It is shown that the standard 
results of real trade theory apply with respect to the comparative statics 
effects of various government policies on this relative price. In partic- 
ular, imposing a tariff on imported goods in the home country lowers 
the relative price of domestic goods in terms of foreign goods in that 
country. This result is  taken as representative of  the effects of  com- 
mercial policy on the real exchange rate. A shift in spending by either 
domestic or foreign residents toward foreign goods at the expense of 
domestic goods (perhaps induced by government policy) has a similar 45  Commercial, Fiscal, Monetary, and Exchange Rate Policies 
qualitative effect on the real exchange rate. So, too, does a transfer of 
purchasing power from domestic residents to foreign residents, which 
results  in  a trade-balance  surplus for the home country. This  result 
reflects the assumption that domestic residents have a positive marginal 
propensity to spend on domestic goods, whereas foreign residents have 
a zero marginal propensity  to spend on the home country’s domestic 
goods. 
In section 2.3 the model is extended to allow for the endogenous 
determination of differences between income and spending by domestic 
residents as a function of both their net asset holdings and the domestic 
real interest rate. Equilibrium in the balance of payments requires that 
this difference between  income and  spending by  domestic residents 
equal the current-account balance, which is the trade balance deter- 
mined by the real sector model of section 2.2  augmented by real interest 
income on net foreign asset holdings. This balance-of-payments equi- 
librium condition provides the basis for a comparative statics analysis 
of the effects of a variety of government policies on the real exchange 
rate. This comparative statics analysis, however, ignores the dynamic 
repercussions of expected changes in the real exchange rate and in the 
path of private net asset holdings. 
In section 2.4 these dynamic considerations are taken into account 
and  a solution is provided  for the complete dynamic version  of the 
model developed  in the previous  two sections. The solution reveals 
that the equilibrium  value of the real  exchange rate at any moment 
depends on expectations concerning the exogenous factors that will 
influence the trade balance in all future periods (including government 
commercial policies) and on expectations concerning the exogenous 
factors that will influence the desired relationship between income and 
spending in all future periods. For constant values of these exogenous 
influences, the dynamic behavior of the real exchange rate is driven 
by  a process of adjusting the private  stock of net foreign assets in a 
manner similar to that delineated in several recent  models of the re- 
lationship between the exchange rate and the current account. 
In section 2.5 this dynamic model is applied to an analysis of gov- 
ernment fiscal policies. A temporary shift in government spending to- 
ward domestic goods at the expense of government spending on foreign 
goods initially  appreciates the real exchange rate (raises the relative 
price of domestic goods), but to a smaller extent than would a per- 
manent spending shift of the same magnitude. This temporary spending 
shift also induces a temporary current-account surplus and an increase 
in private net asset holdings,  which  in turn moderate the immediate 
effect of the spending shift on the real exchange rate by spreading some 
of its effect into periods  after the spending shift itself has ended. A 
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that is expected to occur at some future date. Because private agents 
anticipate the effect of this future spending shift on the real exchange 
rate, the actual real exchange rate and the level of private net asset 
holding react in advance of the actual start of  the spending shift.  A 
temporary general fiscal expansion, financed by an increase in govern- 
ment debt, is also shown to appreciate the real exchange rate in the 
short run, even though private agents may correctly forecast the future 
taxes that will be necessary to pay the interest on the expanded gov- 
ernment debt. As with the temporary spending shift, this temporary 
fiscal expansion causes a temporary increase in private net asset hold- 
ings, which assists in spreading out over time the effects of this fiscal 
expansion on the real exchange rate. In the long run, the temporary 
fiscal expansion depresses the real exchange rate because the higher 
taxes necessary to finance the interest on the expanded government 
debt depress demand for domestic goods. 
Section 2.6 considers the effects of capital controls. These controls 
can influence the real exchange rate by affecting the permissible dif- 
ference between spending and income and hence the level of the current- 
account balance. It is argued, however, that capital controls have only 
a limited capacity to affect the long-run average level of the real ex- 
change rate. Their principal  effect is to influence the responsiveness 
of the real exchange rate to various forms of economic disturbances. 
In  general, a capital  control that fixes  the permissible  value  of  the 
current-account balance increases the sensitivity of the real exchange 
rate to disturbances (such as changes in commercial policies) that shift 
spending between domestic and foreign goods; but it reduces the sen- 
sitivity of the real exchange rate to disturbances that affect the general 
level of spending relative to income. 
Section 2.7 presents an analysis of how monetary policy and nominal 
exchange rate policy can interact to influence the behavior of the real 
exchange rate. In the present model, which assumes full flexibility of 
all nominal prices, monetary policy cannot influence the real exchange 
rate when the nominal exchange rate is fully flexible. Similarly, nominal 
exchange rate policy cannot influence the real exchange rate when the 
domestic money  supply is allowed full flexibility  to adjust to official 
settlements surpluses and deficits.  A  policy that fixes a path for both 
the nominal money supply and the nominal exchange rate, however, 
can influence the real exchange rate and other real variables by affecting 
the behavior of the real money supply. To  support such a combination 
of monetary policy  and  exchange rate policy, a government usually 
must intervene in  the foreign exchange market  on a sterilized basis. 
Such intervention necessarily implies differences between government 
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intervention. In the absence of full Ricardian equivalence between debt 
financing and tax financing of government expenditure, this fiscal effect 
of sterilized  intervention provides a channel through which the com- 
bination of monetary and nominal exchange rate policies can affect the 
real sector of the economy and, in particular, the real exchange rate. 
One example of such a combination of  monetary and exchange rate 
policies is one that simultaneously fixes a level of the domestic money 
supply and pegs a value of the nominal exchange rate. In general, such 
a  policy  combination  is  dynamically  unstable  because the  stock of 
government debt required to finance official intervention in support of 
the policy expands exponentially. This dynamic instability implies that 
a continued belief  in  the  viability  of  such a  policy  combination  by 
private asset holders is inconsistent with rational expectations-an  as- 
sumption that is employed in the dynamic model developed in section 
2.4. To  deal with this difficulty,  I assume that private agents foresee 
the possibility of a change in the nominal exchange rate and relate the 
probability  of  such a change  and  its expected magqitude to the cu- 
mulative extent of official intervention in support of the current nominal 
exchange rate. Under this assumption, it is shown that so long as the 
assessed probability of an immediate parity change remains negligible, 
the real exchange rate is influenced by the combination of fixed nominal 
money  supply and the pegged  nominal  exchange rate in  exactly the 
same way as if private agents never foresaw any prospect of a change 
in the exchange rate. When the cumulative extent of official interven- 
tion reaches the point at which  people begin  to suspect a significant 
probability  of a parity  change  in the near future, the nature  of  the 
dynamic system is modified. The flow of intervention required to sup- 
port the existing nominal exchange rate begins to accelerate, and the 
real exchange that was previously held constant by a constant money 
supply  and  nominal  exchange  rate begins  to rise, in the case of  a 
prospective devaluation, or fall, in  the case of a prospective appreci- 
ation. Ultimately, there is a change in the nominal exchange rate and 
an adjustment of the real exchange rate to the level that is appropriate 
for the new nominal exchange rate and the size of the domestic money 
With slight modifications, this analysis also applies to a policy that 
fixes the rate of growth of the domestic money supply and the rate of 
crawl of the nominal exchange rate, with occasional major changes in 
the nominal exchange rate used to correct persistent  payments imbal- 
ances. The behavior pattern of the real exchange rate, of the current- 
account balance, and of other related variables under this Combination 
of  policies  is  reminiscent  of  the  experiences  of  some  developing 
countries. 
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The paper concludes with a brief restatement of its main contribution 
to the literature and a discussion of the broader range of issues to which 
its analytical framework might be applied. 
2.2  Goods Market Equilibrium, the Trade Balance, and the Real 
Exchange Rate 
Consider a moderate-sized country that produces and consumes two 
goods: a domestic good that is different from goods produced in the 
rest  of the world,  and a traded good (sometimes  referred  to as the 
imported good or foreign good) that is identical to goods produced in 
the rest of the world. This country exports some of its domestic good 
to the rest of the world and imports some of the traded good from the 
rest of  the world.  In addition, the country trades securities, denomi- 
nated in units of traded goods, with the rest of the world. 
The country under consideration is assumed to be small with respect 
to world trade in traded goods and securities in the sense that it takes 
as given the real interest rate in the world securities market for secu- 
rities denominated in traded goods, rf. This interest rate is independent 
of the flow or stock amount of the borrowing and lending the country 
engages in to finance the difference between the value of its exports 
of the domestic good and the cost of its imports of the traded good. 
The country is not small, however, with respect to the market for its 
domestic good. Rather, it faces a foreign demand for this good that is 
less than infinitely elastic with respect to the relative price of this good 
in terms of the traded good. Specifically, the value of foreign excess 
demand for the domestic good (measured in units of the traded good) 
is given by: 
d*  =  -p*q*  + x* 
where q* is the (logarithm of the) relative price of the domestic good 
in terms of the traded goods available to foreign purchasers; p'  > 0 
measures the sensitivity of foreign demand for the domestic good to 
variations  in  q*;  and x*  summarizes the exogenous factors affecting 
foreign demand for the domestic good. Since p" > 0, the relative price 
elasticity of foreign demand for the domestic good, q*  = d[log(d')]/dq' 
= - (p*'d') - 1 is negative. 
Production  possibilities  in  the  home  country are described by  a 
smooth, convex transformation  curve, with  the implication  that the 
supply of the domestic good is an increasing function of its relative 
price, whereas the supply of the traded good is a decreasing function 
of that relative  price. Domestic demand for the domestic good  is a 
decreasing function of its relative price, and domestic demand for the 
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demand for each good is an increasing function of total domestic spend- 
ing.  This  standard specification  of supply and demand conditions in 
the home country is  consistent with  the following log-linear  specifi- 
cation of domestic excess demand for traded goods,f, and of the value 
(in terms of the traded good) of domestic excess demand for the do- 
mestic good, d, such that: 
(2) 
(3)  d  =  -p4  + x + mJJ. 
f=  pq -  x + (1 - a)* 
In these excess demand functions, 4 denotes the logarithm of the price 
of the domestic good relative to the price paid for the traded good by 
domestic producers and consumers; p > 0 measures the sensitivity of 
these excess demands to changes in 4;  u and  1 - u  are the shares of 
the domestic good and the traded good, respectively, in domestic spend- 
ing: + is the excess of domestic spending over the value of the domestic 
product; and x summarizes the exogenous factors affecting domestic 
excess demands for the domestic and traded goods (including tastes, 
production possibilities,  and government policies). Note that the total 
value of domestic excess demand for both goods, d + f, must equal 
the excess of domestic spending over  the value of the domestic product, 
+. Note also that changes in  4 or x,  holding + constant, must have 
offsetting effects on d andf. Note finally that since p is assumed to be 
positive, the relative price elasticity of domestic demand for imports 
of the traded good, q =  -p/f,  is negative. 
The relative price of the domestic good confronting domestic resi- 
dents differs from the relative price confronting foreign residents when 
the government of the home country imposes an ad valorem tariff on 
imports of traded goods or, equivalently, an ad valorem tax on exports 
of domestic goods. Formally, the effects of such commercial policies 
are indicated by the following relationship: 
(4)  4'  = 4 + 7, 
where  T  is the logarithm of one (1)  plus the ad valorem tax rate on 
either imports of the traded good or exports of the domestic good. 
With this commercial policy in force, the condition for equilibrium 
in the market for the domestic good that must be satisfied at all times 
is expressed by: 
(5)  0 = d + d* =  -(@ + P*)q + (x + xi  - P*T) + u+. 
Further, at all times, the trade balance of the home country is the excess 
of the value of its exports of the domestic good, 8,  over the value of 
its imports of the traded good; that is: 50  Michael Mussa 
From equations (5)  and (6), we arrive at the conclusion: 
(7)  T = v(z - q) = -*, 
where v = (p + p*)/u,  and z  = (x + x* + p*~)/(p  + p”). This result 
expresses the equivalence between the absorption and elasticities ap- 
proaches to analyzing the trade balance. According to the elasticities 
approach, the trade balance depends on the terms of trade (represented 
by q)  through the relationship T = v(z -  4).  According to the absorption 
approach, the trade balance equals the excess of the value of the do- 
mestic product over the domestic expenditure, that is, T = - +. 
It is worthwhile to emphasize that this result concerning the trade 
balance and the equations that underlie it are consistent with several 
possible specifications of the production structure of the economy. One 
specification is that of the standard two-country, two-commodity model 
described in the pure theory of international trade (summarized, for 
instance, by Mundell 1968, chaps. 1-3).  In this specification, both the 
domestic good and the foreign good are produced (as well as consumed) 
in  the home country, and the domestic good is distinguished only by 
the fact that it is exported by the home country. Another specification, 
one more commonly used in two-country, macroeconomic models (see 
Mussa 1979 and the references cited there), states that the home coun- 
try produces only its domestic good and the rest of the world produces 
only the foreign good. A third specification is the “dependent econ- 
omy” model developed by Salter (1959) and Swan (1960), which has 
been widely applied in both trade theory and open economy macro- 
economics. In this specification, the domestic good is a nontraded good 
that is produced and consumed exclusively within the home country 
(d’  therefore is equal to zero), while the foreign good is an interna- 
tionally traded good that is produced and consumed in the home coun- 
try and may be either imported or exported depending on whether the 
home country has a trade deficit or a trade surplus. All of the analysis 
in this paper is consistent with all three of these specifications of pro- 
duction structure, though the interpretation of  some results depends 
on the particular specification one has in mind. 
The standard results of the real theory of international trade con- 
cerning the effects of import tariffs or export taxes and transfers paid 
to residents of the home country (usually derived in the standard two- 
country, two-commodity model) are obtained by applying implicit dif- 
ferentiation to equation (7) and evaluating the results where  T  = 0, 
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The positive value of the denominator in (8) and (9), p + p*, reflects 
the fact that the Marshall-Lerner condition is satisfied; that is, the sum 
of the import demand elasticities plus one (1) is negative, such that: 
(10)  q + q*  +  1  = (-Ply-)  + [(-P*/d‘) - 11  +  1 
=  -(p  + P*)/f<  0. 
Equation (8) expresses the standard result that a tariff on traded goods 
imported into the home country reduces the relative domestic price of 
domestic goods (increases the relative domestic price of traded goods) 
and increases the relative foreign price of  domestic goods. (See, for 
example, Mundell  1968, chap.  3.)  Equation (9) says that a transfer 
received by residents of the home country (which allows an excess of 
domestic spending over domestic income, represented  by  a positive 
value of  --I))  pushes up the  relative  price  of  domestic goods. This 
positive effect of a transfer received (and spent) by domestic residents 
on the relative price of domestic goods reflects a determinate sign of 
the transfer problem criterion (see again Mundell 1968, chap. 2) that 
arises because the marginal propensity of domestic residents to spend 
on  domestic goods  is  positive,  whereas the  marginal propensity  of 
foreigners (who pay the transfer) to spend on domestic goods is zero. 
For the purposes of this discussion, equation (8) is a key result that 
summarizes the basic mechanism  through  which commercial  policy 
works its effects on the economy. Specifically, changes in commercial 
policy, represented by changes in 7,  affect the relative price of domestic 
goods and thereby affect all of the production and consumption deci- 
sions that are influenced by this relative price.  If the relative price of 
domestic goods is defined as the “real exchange rate,” it follows that 
other policies can replicate the effects  of  commercial policy  to the 
extent that they have similar effects on the real exchange rate. 
There are two general mechanisms through which economic policies 
may have such effects on the real exchange rate. First, economic pol- 
icies can  affect the exogenous shift variable, x,  that appears in  the 
domestic excess demand  functions and perhaps also the exogenous 
shift variable, x*, that appears in the foreign excess demand function 
for the domestic good. Formally, the effects of changes in x and x* on 
q are obtained by implicit differentiation of the trade balance equilib- 
rium condition, T = v -  (z - q) = 0, such that: 
(11)  dqldx = dq*/dx = l/(p + p*); dq/dx* = dq*/dx* = 1/(p + p”). 
For example, a shift of government spending in the home country away 
from domestic goods and toward domestically produced traded goods 
induces a decrease in x and implies a decrease in q that is similar to 
that  induced  by  an  increase in the tariff  rate.  Alternatively,  a tax- 
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induces a decrease  in x  because the reduction in private sector spending 
resulting from the tax increase is spread over both domestic and traded 
goods. Second, as indicated  by  equation (9), economic policies  can 
affect the real  exchange rate by  altering the difference between do- 
mestic  spending  and  domestic income.  Specifically, any policy  that 
reduces domestic spending relative to domestic income (holding x,  s*, 
and T constant) will reduce q and replicate the effects of an increase 
in the tariff rate on imports of traded goods. Further investigation of 
this mechanism  through  which  economic policies can affect the real 
exchange rate and thereby replicate many of the effects of commercial 
policy is the principal  subject of the remainder of paper. 
2.3  Balance-of-Payments Equilibrium and Comparative Statics 
To  analyze policies that affect the real exchange rate by influencing 
the difference between spending and income, we must specify the de- 
terminants of differences between spending and income and describe 
the  condition  of  balance-of-payments  equilibrium.  This  equilibrium 
condition  may  then  be  employed  to provide  an initial  comparative 
statics analysis of the effects of a variety of policies on the real exchange 
rate. 
Suppose that the desired  excess of private spending over private 
income for the country under consideration is given by: 
(12)  h  = FA - olr  + u, 
where h measures the excess  of spending over income in terms of traded 
goods; A is the net stock of privately held assets denominated in traded 
goods; r is the real rate of return that domestic residents expect to earn 
on their net asset holdings;  u summarizes the exogenous factors af- 
fecting h (including some government policies); and p > 0 and ci  > 0 
are parameters indicating the responsiveness of  h to variations in A 
and r. Since privately issued securities net out against privately held 
securities, net  private  securities  holdings  must  consist  of  securities 
issued by foreigners (or debts owed to foreigners if A < 0) or holdings 
of bonds issued by the domestic government. Since real interest income 
earned on private net asset holdings is included in private sector in- 
come, the positive  value  of the parameter p implies that a rise in A 
increases desired private  spending by  more than  it increases private 
income. Further, since excesses of private spending over private in- 
come must be financed at the expense of private net asset holdings, it 
follows that: 53  Commercial, Fiscal, Monetary, and Exchange Rate Policies 
where D[A(t)]  = A(t +  1) -  A(t)  is the forward difference in the level 
of A. 
The excess of spending over income for the home country includes 
the excess of government  spending over government revenue, g, as 
well as the excess of private  spending over private income, h. Gov- 
ernment spending includes the real interest that the government must 
pay  on its outstanding stock of government debt, G. The excess of 
government spending over government revenue is financed by issuing 
(or retiring) government debt, that is: 
(14)  D(G) = g. 
The net asset position of the home country as a whole, N,  is equal to 
the excess of privately held net assets over the outstanding stock of 
government debt, such that: 
(15)  N=A-G. 
The change in this net asset position corresponds to the total excess 
of income over spending, or: 
(16)  D(N) =  -(h  + g). 
The desired change in net assets implied by equation (16) may be 
thought of as the desired capital outflow of the home country. For the 
economic system to be in equilibrium, this desired capital outflow must 
correspond to the current-account balance, which  is the sum of the 
trade balance and the service-account balance. The trade balance is 
given by equation (7) as T  = u(z - 4).  The service-account balance 
is the real interest income that the home country earns on its net asset 
position, which is equal to the real interest rate prevailing in the world 
securities market, r*, multiplied  by N  = A  - G. If  equation (12) is 
substituted into equation (16), the critical requirement for momentary 
equilibrium in the economic system may be expressed as the balance- 
of-payments equilibrium condition, or: 
(17)  v(z - q) + r*(A - G) = ar - FA - u - g. 
In  this  condition,  the expected real  rate of  return on private asset 
holdings is  not  identified with  r* because some government policies 
induce divergences between r and rf and because expected changes in 
the relative price of domestic goods also imply such divergences. 
Preliminary conclusions concerning the capacity of various policies 
to replicate the effects of commercial  policy  by  influencing the real 
exchange rate may be obtained by applying implicit differentiation to 
the balance-of-payments equilibrium condition ( 17). These conclusions 
are only preliminary because they ignore the dynamic effects of induced 
changes in asset stocks and of changes in anticipations of future pol- 54  Michael Mussa 
icies, which are examined in  later sections. But they do apply (under 
appropriate assumptions and specifications) to the long-run effects of 
permanent  changes in government policies when account is taken of 
these dynamic complications. 
First, consider an increase in the outstanding stock of government 
debt. If  z, A,  u,  u, and g are held constant, the change in q necessary 
to maintain balance-of-payments equilibrium in the face of an increase 
in G is given by: 
(18)  dqlDG =  -u*lu  =  -ar*/(p + p*). 
The explanation of this result is that a larger stock of government debt 
requires a higher flow of net interest payments to the foreigners who 
must be the holders of this debt if  the net assets of the private sector 
are constant. With a constant desired capital outflow (or inflow), this 
increase in net interest payments requires an improvement in the trade 
balance, which in turn requires a lower relative price of domestic goods, 
This conclusion,  it  should  be  emphasized, does not  depend on the 
assumption that the increased taxes necessary to finance the interest 
on the expanded government  debt are ignored by the private sector. 
Since I: is defined as the excess of government spending (including 
interest payments on government debt) over government revenue, and 
since g is held  constant, the implicit assumption is that taxes are in- 
creased sufficiently to pay the increased interest on the expanded gov- 
ernment debt. Private sector income falls by the amount of this increase 
in taxes. Since h is the excess of private sector spending over private 
sector income, and since h is held constant in the derivation of equation 
(18), this result embodies the assumption that private sector spending 
falls by the amount of the increased taxes necessary to finance interest 
payments on the expanded government debt. Indeed, the decline in 
the relative price of the domestic good in response to an increase in 
the outstanding stock of government debt is precisely the appropriate 
relative price response to a transfer of spending from domestic resi- 
dents, who have a positive marginal propensity to spend on domestic 
goods, to foreigners  (the  recipients  of  the interest paid  on  the  net 
government debt), who have a zero marginal propensity  to spend on 
domestic goods. 
Essential to equation (18) is an implicit assumption that the private 
sector does not view government debt as a liability, in the sense that 
the stock of such debt exerts a negative effect on the desired excess 
of private spending over  private income that is equivalent to the positive 
effect, FA,  exerted by  privately  held  net assets. This assumption is 
consistent with the notion of Metzler (1951) and Mundell (1960) that 
marketable assets exert a positive effect on desired spending beyond 
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ciated with government debt are not regarded as marketable liabilities 
that offset this effect of marketable  assets. (An alternative approach 
to eliminating Ricardian  equivalence  between  debt financing and tax 
financing of  government  expenditures is  to assume an overlapping- 
generations model with no bequest motive.  For a recent  and elegant 
version of this model, see Blanchard 1984; see Frenkel and Razin 1984 
for an application of this model in the context of an open economy.) 
Were this not the case, a term -  pG would have to be included among 
the factors affecting the desired excess of private spending over private 
income, so that equation (12) would become: 
(12')  h  = p(A - G) - ar + N. 
This modification would add the term pG to the right-hand side of the 
balance-of-payments equilibrium condition ( 17) and would modify the 
result (18) to: 
(18')  dqldC = -  (u* + p)/~. 
This  result, however,  would  not  represent the long-run  equilibrium 
effect of an increase in the stock of government debt because in equa- 
tion (12') an increase in G implies a reduction in h and hence an increase 
in  the rate of accumulation of privately held net assets. The long-run 
cumulative effect of this change in private asset accumulation is that 
privately held  net assets would rise by exactly the amount of the in- 
crease in  the stock of government debt. In the long run, therefore, 
there would be no reduction in domestic spending and an increase in 
foreign  spending because the increased  interest and associated taxes 
on the expanded government  debt would be exactly offset by the in- 
creased interest received on privately held net assets. consequently, 
under these conditions an increase in  the stock of government debt 
would have no long-run effect on the relative price of domestic goods. 
(In Barro's [I9741 terminology, there would be no long-run net wealth 
effect from changes in the stock of government debt because they would 
be fully offset by changes in private security holdings.) 
Consider now a second dynamic  complication: a temporary reduction 
in the general level of taxation. The short-run effect of  this policy is a 
temporary increase in government expenditure relative to government 
revenue, that is, a temporary increase  in  g. Maintaining  balance-of- 
payments equilibrium in the face of this increase in g,  with given values 
of z,  A,  G, r, and u,  requires an increase in the relative price of domestic 
goods, such that: 
(19) 
This result embodies the assumption that the private sector does not 
forecast the future tax liability implicit in the flow of government debt 
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that finances the current tax reduction. As a result, the excess of private 
spending over private income does not decline in response to the in- 
crease in government expenditure relative to government revenue; in- 
stead, private spending rises to the extent of the tax reduction. Part of 
this increase in private  spending is for purchases of  domestic goods 
and thus forces an increase in  the  relative  price  of  those goods to 
maintain  equilibrium  in  the domestic goods market. Over time, the 
temporary reduction in taxes enlarges the stock of  government debt, 
and (under the assumptions of this analysis) this increase in the stock 
of government debt tends to offset the direct effect of the tax reduction 
in reducing q. Ultimately, when taxes are increased sufficiently to elim- 
inate the government deficit, the long-run effect of the temporary tax 
reduction  is to raise the long-run  stock of government  debt and the 
long-run level of taxes required  to  finance  the interest  on this debt. 
The long-term effect of the temporary tax reduction (again, under the 
assumptions of this analysis) is therefore to reduce the long-term equi- 
librium value of the real exchange rate for precisely the reasons dis- 
cussed above in connection with the effects of an increase in the out- 
standing stock of government debt. 
Third, consider a policy  that permanently  raises the expected real 
rate of return for private asset holders, such as a permanent reduction 
in the tax rate on interest income. At given values of A, G, g, u, and 
z,  an increase in Y reduces the desired excess of private spending over 
private income and requires a reduction  in q to maintain  balance-of- 
payments equilibrium, that is: 
Over time, however,  the reduction  in h  implied  by  an increase  in  r 
generates a higher net stock of  privately held assets, and the effect of 
an increase in A on the relative price of domestic goods is given by: 
(21)  dq/dA = (p  + r*)/u. 
The cumulative change in  A necessary to offset the increase in r and 
return h to the zero value consistent with no further changes in A is 
given by AA  = (a/p)Ar,  where Ar is the policy-induced change in r. It 
is easily shown that the combined long-run effect of the increase in  r 
and the induced increase in A on the relative price of domestic goods 
is given by: 
(22)  Aq = ( -&)Ar  + [(p + r*)/’v]AA  = (r*/v)AA  = (c~r*/v)Ar. 
The reason for this increase in the long-run equilibrium  value of q in 
response to a policy-induced  increase in  r is that the long-run level of 
income of domestic residents rises due to the increase inA and domestic 
residents spend a fraction of this increased income on domestic goods, 
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to  the  importance  of  distinguishing  between short-run and  long-run 
effects when considering the consequences of government policies that 
affect the real exchange rate. 
2.4  A Dynamic Model of  the Real Exchange Rate 
A complete, dynamic analysis of government policies that affect the 
real  exchange rate  must  take account of  endogenously  determined 
changes in  the  net  stock of  privately  held  assets that occur as the 
counterpart of current-account imbalances. The analysis must also ac- 
count for the influence  of expected changes in the relative  price  of 
domestic  goods on economic behavior.  To provide a benchmark  for 
such an analysis, it is useful first to examine the dynamic interactions 
among the real exchange rate, the net stock of privately held assets, 
and  the current-account balance  in  the absence of  any government 
interventions. For this purpose, it is assumed that the stock of  gov- 
ernment debt is constant at zero and that government expenditure and 
government revenue are also zero. 
Since no tax is imposed on private  security  holdings, the interest 
rate earned on such holdings is the real interest rate, r*,  that prevails 
in the world securities market. The real rate of return that influences 
private spending and saving decisions, r, however, is equal to r* only 
when no capital gains or losses on private security holdings are antic- 
ipated. More generally,  the expected real  rate of  return for private 
security holders is given by: 
(23)  I’  = r’; - aD’(q), 
where D’(q)  denotes the expected rate of  change in the relative price 
of domestic goods. The rationale for this relationship is that the real 
yield relevant for the spending and saving decisions of domestic resi- 
dents is measured relative to a consumption basket that contains both 
domestic and traded goods. This real yield on a security with a fixed 
price and fixed interest rate in terms of traded goods is less than r* to 
the extent of the expected growth rate of the relative price of domestic 
goods, multiplied by the share of domestic goods in  the consumption 
basket. This assumption concerning the domestic real interest rate is 
a common feature of models that allow for changes in the real exchange 
rate, in  particular,  those in  Dornbusch (1983), Mussa (1982a; 1984), 
and Obstfeld (1981a; 1983). 
This specification  of the domestic real  interest  rate, together with 
the assumptions that G  = 0 and g  = 0, implies that the balance-of- 
payments equilibrium condition (17) can be written as: 
(24)  V(Z - 4)  + I’*A  = w - c~aD’(q)  - FA, 58  Michael Mussa 
where w = Lyre -  u summarizes all of the exogenous factors (including 
the world real interest rate) that influence the desired excess of private 
income over private  spending.  Equation (26) is a dynamic equation 
because it specifies the expected rate of change of the relative price of 
domestic goods and because it specifies the net stock of privately held 
assets. That stock changes whenever private income differs from pri- 
vate spending. More specifically: 
(25)  D(A) =  -h  = w - auD'(q) - PA. 
Under the assumption of the rationality of  expectations, equations 
(24) and (25) constitute a dynamic system that constrains the expected 
evolution of  the relative price of domestic goods and the net stock of 
privately held assets, conditional on the information available at a given 
date. In matrix form, this dynamic system may be written as: 
(26)  ["""' - 
The economically appropriate solution of this dynamic system yields 
the following expression for the current expected equilibrium value of 
the real exchange rate, q(t)  = E[q(t);  tl: 
r* 
+
  J [j  =  --J.  p.  + De  auDe 
(27)  qe(t)  = q(t) + y[A'(t) - A(t)l, 
where q(t)  is the current expected long-run equilibrium value of  the 
real exchange rate; Ae(t) = E[A(t);  t]  is the current expected level of 
net private asset holdings; xis  the current expected long-run equilib- 
rium level of net private asset holdings; and y > 0 is a parameter that 
determines the responsiveness of qe(t)  to deviations between Ap(t)  and 
&t). The values of q(t),  &t), and y are determined by: 
(28)  q(t) = +(t) + (r*/v)A(t) 
(31) 
where the discount factor 8 involved in the definitions of x(t)  and +(t) 
is given by: 
y = (Ah) - (l/au), 
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and  where  X  is  the  positive  characteristic  root  associated  with  the 
dynamic system (26), such that: 
(33)  A  = (1/2){[r* + (v/acr)l + v“r*  + (v/au)I2 + 4(vp./acr)}. 
The results (28) through  (33) may be  interpreted as follows.  (For 
further discussion, see Mussa 1984.) Equation (16) states that the cur- 
rent expected long-run equilibrium real exchange rate, &?), is the real 
exchange rate expected to make the present discounted value (using 
the discount factor 0) of trade imbalances equal to zero, namely, ?(?) 
as defined by  (29), adjusted for the effect  of  expected  net  interest 
income on the current expected long-run equilibrium level of privately 
held  net  assets. According to equation (30), this expected  long-run 
equilibrium level of privately held net assets is the expected present 
discounted value (using the discount factor 0) of the exogenous factors 
affecting the desired excess of private spending over private income, 
divided by the sensitivity of this excess of private income over private 
spending to the actual level of privately held net assets. Equation (3  1) 
defines the reduced-form parameter, y, that appears in (27) in terms of 
the more basic parameters that appear in the balance-of-payments equi- 
librium condition (24). From (33), it is easily established that y > r*/v, 
which is necessarily positive. Equation (32) indicates that the positive 
characteristic root X plays the role of the “discount rate” in the expres- 
sions that define ?(?) and A(?).  Equation (33) relates the value of  this 
discount rate to the parameters that appear in the balance-of-payments 
equilibrium condition (24). 
Because no restriction has been placed on the expected behavior of 
the exogenous factors affecting the trade balance (the z  terms) or on 
the exogenous factors affecting the desired excess of private income 
over private spending (the w terms), these results provide a description 
of the determinants of the current expected equilibrium real exchange 
rate under a wide variety of possible assumptions about how economic 
conditions are expected to change over time. This generalizability has 
its  costs: it  increases the  complexity  of  the model required  for the 
analysis.  But it also has important benefits: it allows an analysis of 
expected changes in  government policies and other exogenous vari- 
ables; it incorporates a variety of notions of permanent and transitory 
changes in government policies and other exogenous variables; and it 
distinguishes between the expected effects of expected changes in these 
exogenous  variables and the unexpected effects attributable  to new 
information about present and future government policies and other 
exogenous disturbances. 
When the exogenous factors affecting the trade balance and the de- 
sired excess of  private  spending are known to have constant values 
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process governing the expected evolution of the real exchange rate and 
the net stock of privately held assets can be described quite simply. 
Since there is no good reason to distinguish between the expected and 
the actual values of q and A when the z and w terms are equal to known 
constants, this description applies just as well to the actual evolution 
of q and A.  The description is illustrated in those terms in figure 2.1. 
The dynamic process described in this figure embodies the essential 
features of a number of  recent analyses of the dynamic interactions 
among the current-account balance, the level of net foreign assets, and 
the real exchange rate, in particular, those in Kouri (1976), Calvo and 
Rodriquez (1977), Dornbusch and Fischer (1980), and Obstfeld (1981a). 
Suppose that the initial net level of privately held assets, A,, is greater 
than the long-run equilibrium level, A  = */k. Then, as illustrated in 
the left-hand side of the figure, the initial equilibrium real exchange 
rate, qo = 4  + y(Ao - A),  must be above the long-run equilibrium 
real exchange rate, 4  = 2  + (r*/v)A.  As illustrated in the right-hand 
side of the figure, this initial real exchange rate implies an initial current- 
account deficit, bo = v(2 -  4,)  + r*Ao = (vy - r*)(A  -  A,) < 0. This 
current-account deficit implies a decline in the net stock of privately 
held assets between period 0 and period  1, such that D(A,) = bo = 
(vy -  r*)(A -  A,) < 0. This decline in net assets implies that the real 
exchange rate in period  1, q1 = q + ?(A, - A),  as determined on the 
right side of the figure, must be below its previous value but still above 
its long-run equilibrium value. The fact that  this decline in  the real 
exchange rate, D(q0) - @(Ao)  - ybo, was anticipated in period  0 
implies that the domestic real interest rate in that period, ro = Y* - 
mD(q,), must have been above its long-run equilibrium value, r*. In 
period  1,  this process repeats, starting with a net  stock of privately 
held assets, Al,  that is between A. and A.  Over time, the net stock of 
privately  held  assets, the real  exchange rate, and the domestic real 
interest rate all gradually decline toward their respective long-run equi- 
librium values, and the current-account deficit is gradually eliminated. 
The dynamic process illustrated in figure 2.1 is the process by which 
the economic system converges toward the fixed long-run equilibrium 
position determined by known constant values of the exogenous forcing 
variables z and w.  The essential driving force in this adjustment process 
is the gradual adjustment of the net stock of privately held assets toward 
its long-run equilibrium level. There are limited circumstances in which 
this single element of a more complex dynamic system provides an 
essentially complete description of  the dynamic response of the eco- 
nomic system to some change in economic conditions. In particular, 
consider a permanent (constant) increase in the tariff rate applied to 
imports of  traded goods, AT > 0. Such a tariff increase reduces the 
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Fig. 2.1  The dynamic interaction among the exchange rate, asset stocks, and the current account. 62  Michael Mussa 
z  = x + x* - P*T, by a known constant amount, P*AT. This implies 
that the real exchange rate consistent with long-run equilibrium in the 
trade balance, q,  falls by the amount - @*AT.  If  the tariff increase is 
assumed not to affect the exogenous factor that influences the desired 
excess of private spending over private income, it follows that there 
is no change in  = dp  and hence that the real exchange rate consistent 
with long-run equilibrium in the current account, 4, falls by the same 
amount as q.  In terms of figure 2.1, this means that the schedule showing 
q(t)  as a function of A(t)  on the right side and the schedule showing 
b(t)  as a function of q(t)  on the left both shift downward to the extent 
of the reduction in e and 4.  Whatever the net stock of privately held 
assets at the time of the permanent tariff increase, therefore, the im- 
mediate effect of the tariff increase is to reduce q(t)  by the same amount 
as the reductions in e and 4. Depending on whether A(t)  is greater or 
less than A,  q will subsequently fall or rise toward its new long-run 
equilibrium value as A  converges to A.  At each moment, q will  be 
below the value it would have had in the absence of the tariff increase 
by precisely the amount that measures the long-run equilibrium effect 
of the tariff increase. 
The dynamic system of equation (26) and its solution given by equa- 
tions (28) through (33) may also be used to analyze changes in the tariff 
rate that are expected to be temporary or permanent at some future 
date. Such commercial policy changes imply either a temporary change 
in the level of the forcing variable, z, that will occur at some specific 
future date. These changes may also imply changes in the exogenous 
forcing variable, w,  that accounts for the desired spending and saving 
behavior of the private sector. The reason w may be affected is that 
temporary changes in commercial policy or changes that are expected 
to occur at a future date affect  the expected time path of  the real 
exchange rate and hence private incentives for spending and saving. 
This point  has  recently  been  emphasized  by  Razin and  Svennsson 
(1983) (see also Svennsson and Razin 1983) and is represented formally 
in the present model by allowing for changes in the path of w as well 
as in the path of z. Given the prescribed changes in the paths of these 
exogenous forcing variables, the general solution of the model provides 
a description of how the real exchange rate responds to expected tem- 
porary or future changes in commercial policy. 
2.5  Fiscal Policy and the Real Exchange Rate 
The dynamic model presented in the previous section may be applied 
to analyze the effect on the real exchange rate of shifts of government 
spending between domestic and foreign goods. Recall that in section 
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pense of government spending on foreign goods is represented by an 
increase in the exogenous factor x that enters positively into the value 
of  excess demand for domestic goods and negatively into the value of 
excess demand for foreign goods. In the dynamic model of section 2.4, 
such an increase in x translates into a corresponding increase in the 
exogenous forcing variable, z. It follows that an unexpected permanent 
shift in  government  spending away from  foreign goods and  toward 
domestic goods, Ax > 0, will increase the equilibrium real exchange 
rate given by equation (27) by  a constant amount, Aq = (&)Ax,  at 
every moment, relative to the value it would have had in the absence 
of this government spending shift. This result is, of course, the same 
as the  one obtained in  the  initial comparative  statics analysis of  a 
government spending shift described in section 2.2. 
The virtue of  the dynamic model of  section 2.4 is that it permits 
analysis of any more complicated shift in  the actual or expected dis- 
tribution of government spending between domestic and foreign goods. 
In particular,  consider an unexpected  shift of government spending 
toward domestic goods, Ax, at time t that is expected to last only T 
periods. The effect of this unexpected temporary spending shift on the 
real exchange rate in period t is Aq(t) = (a/v)(Ax)(l - W), which is 
smaller than the effect of a permanent spending shift of the same mag- 
nitude. As the time when the spending shift will be terminated ap- 
proaches, the effect of the shift on the real exchange rate consistent 
with long-run trade-balance equilibrium diminishes, with Aq(s) = (d 
v)(Ax)(l - fjT+'-9  for c < s < (T + t).  The effect on e, however, is 
not the only effect of the temporary spending shift on the real exchange 
rate.  Because private asset  holders  know that the spending shift is 
temporary, they anticipate that q will change in period t + T when the 
temporary spending shifts ends. This anticipated change in q affects 
the expected real interest rate for domestic residents  who consume 
both  domestic and foreign goods and thereby  affects their spending 
and  saving behavior. Between period  t and period  t  +  T, domestic 
residents expect future declines in q and therefore save more than they 
otherwise would.  This implies that  the private net  stock of foreign 
assets, A(s),  rises above the level it would otherwise have for t < s < 
(t + T).  It follows that Aq(s) > Aq(s)  for t < s < (t + 2'). Moreover, 
since A(t + T)  is greater than the value it would have in the absence 
of the temporary spending shift, it follows that q(s)  remains somewhat 
above the level it would have in the absence of the temporary spending 
shift for s 3 (T + t)  and only gradually converges back toward its 
previous path, as the increase in A  built up between t and t  +  T is 
gradually run down. 
Another application of the dynamic model is in the analysis of a shift 
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T periods in the future. Suppose that private agents first learn of this 
spending shift in period  t and that they expect it will be permanent 
once it starts in period t + T. Even though this expected future spending 
shift has no immediate direct effect on excess demands for domestic 
and foreign goods, it does have an immediate effect on the real exchange 
rate equal to Aq(t) = (u/v)(Ax)(8*),  where Ax  is the size of the per- 
manent spending shift that is expected to occur at t  + T. The source 
of this change in q(t)  is the change in the real exchange rate anticipated 
to be consistent with long-run equilibrium in the trade balance, Aq(t). 
Over the period between t and t  + T, the real exchange rate is also 
affected by induced changes in private net asset holdings, which are 
reduced relative to their previously expected path because private agents 
anticipate increases  in  q  as the  moment  of  the  spending  shift  ap- 
proaches. The decrease in A(t + T)  relative to the level it would have 
had in the absence of anticipations of the spending shift implies that 
q(t + T)  as determined by  equation (27) is below the level it would 
have if the spending shift suddenly became known at T + t. Thus, the 
effect of spending shift being anticipated in period t, rather than be- 
coming known  in  period  t  +  T,  is that the adjustment of  the real 
exchange rate to this spending shift is spread out over time, rather than 
occurring all at once in period  f  + T.  Some of  the adjustment of q 
takes place immediately when the spending shift is first anticipated in 
period t. Further adjustment of q happens between t and t  + T, and 
some adjustment takes place after t + T, as private net asset holdings 
are raised back to the path they would have followed in the absence 
of anticipations of  the spending shift. 
With slight modification, the dynamic model of section 2.4 may also 
be used  to analyze the effects on the real exchange rate of general 
fiscal policy, defined as variations in the debt-financed difference be- 
tween government expenditure and government revenue, g. To  deal 
with general fiscal policy, the balance-of-payments equilibrium condi- 
tion must be modified from equation (24) to: 
(34)  V(Z - 4)  + r*(A - G) = w - ctuD'(q) -  -  g, 
where G is the stock of government debt, and g is the excess of gov- 
ernment spending (including interest payments on outstanding debt) 
over government revenue. With this modification, the dynamic system 
determining the expected future evolution of q and A is given by: 
The only difference  between this dynamic  system and the dynamic 
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is now w -  vz -  g + r*G,  whereas before it was simply w -  vz. The 
additional term (r'G -  g)  in this forcing variable accounts for the effects 
of general fiscal policy. The solution of the dynamic system (35) is the 
same as the  solution of  the dynamic system  (26),  as given by  (27) 
through  (33), except that the expression for the  real exchange rate 
consistent with long-run equilibrium in the trade balance, G(t),  given 
by (29) must be modified by replacing the forcing variable z(t + j)  with 
y(t + j) = z(t + 53  + (l/v)[g(t  + 51 -  r*G(t + j)]. 
With this modification in mind, consider now an unexpected tem- 
porary fiscal expansion in which lump-sum taxes are cut by a constant 
amount for T periods, starting in the current period t,  without any tax 
increases to finance the increased interest payments on the expanding 
government debt until period t + T, when taxes are raised sufficiently 
to eliminate the deficit. This policy translates into a constant unex- 
pected increase in y(s)  for t 5  s < (t + T) and a constant unexpected 
decrease in y(s)  for s 2  (t + T) equal to the interest on the increase 
in the government debt between t and t  + T. The effect of  this fiscal 
policy on the real exchange rate at time t is given by: 
(36)  Aq(t) = Aq(t) = (1 - 8)[1  - OT(l + ~*)'](AK/v) > 0, 
where AK >  0 is the amount of the reduction in lump-sum taxes (relative 
to their previously expected path) between t and t + T. This effect on 
the real exchange rate is positive because the discount rate A used in 
calculating q(t),  as given by (33), is larger than r* and therefore implies 
that W(1  + r*)* = [(l  + r*)/(l + A)IT is less than one. As time goes 
by, the size of the increase in q(s) for t < s < (t + T) diminishes and 
ultimately turns negative because the number of future periods in which 
taxes will be lower is diminishing and the date at which taxes will be 
raised to cover the deficit is approaching. After time t  + T, q(s)  is 
reduced permanently by the amount (AK/v)[(~  + r*)T - 13, which rep- 
resents the long-run equilibrium effect on q of the increased taxes that 
are imposed to finance the increased interest on the expanded stock 
of  government debt. 
Except in period t,  the response of q(s)  to the fiscal policy does not 
mirror exactly the response of q(s) because the expectations of changes 
in q induced by the policy influence private saving behavior and hence 
the path of  the private net stock of foreign assets. Specifically, since 
q is expected to decline after its initial upward jump in period t,  A(s) 
rises above its level in  the absence of the fiscal policy for t < s < (t 
+ T)  and gradually falls back to its previous path for s 2  (t + 7'). In 
accord with equation (27), this increase in A(s)  relative to its previous 
path results in an increase in q(s)  relative to ij(s). The overall result, 
as illustrated in figure 2.2,  is that during the interval between  t and t 
+ T, A&)  remains positive even after Aq(s) has become negative. By 66  Michael Mussa 
period t  + T,  Aq(s)  is negative but smaller in absolute value than A+(s). 
Only as the increased  net stock of private asset holdings built up be- 
tween t and t + T is run down does Aq(s)  fall to the long-run equilibrium 
level of AG(s). 
This analysis of the effects of general fiscal policy can be extended 
to other examples embodying alternative specifications of the paths of 
g  and G and hence of the exogenous forcing variable y  = i + (l/u)(g 
-  r*G).  Rather than pursuing such examples, however, it is more useful 
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to investigate the elements of the specification  of the present model 
that allow general fiscal  policy  to influence the behavior of  the real 
exchange rate. 
The short-run effect of expansionary fiscal policy in raising the real 
exchange rate does not depend on the failure of private asset holders 
to forecast future tax liabilities correctly or on the failure of the gov- 
ernment to impose taxes sufficient to pay the interest on thegovernment 
debt. It does depend, however, on the absence of full Ricardian equiv- 
alence between debt-financed and tax-financed government spending. 
In  the example just considered  (as  should be the case in  any well- 
specified example of fiscal policy), the government’s  intertemporal  bud- 
get constraint is satisfied because the government ultimately (starting 
in  period  t  +  T)  raises taxes sufficiently to pay the interest on the 
expanded stock of government debt. Private  agents foresee this tax 
increase starting in  period  t when  the policy  is  introduced, and the 
reaction of the real exchange rate to the new policy, as given by equa- 
tion (36), reflects the anticipation of these future taxes. The effect of 
the anticipated increase in future taxes reduces but does not eliminate 
the expansionary effect of the government deficit because the discount 
rate, A, that is applied to determine the effect of future taxes on the 
current real exchange rate is greater than the interest rate, r*, on gov- 
ernment debt. If private saving responded immediately to the govern- 
ment deficit in the manner required to maintain Ricardian equivalence 
between debt financing and tax financing of government spending,  there 
would be no such expansionary effect of fiscal policy. In this case, the 
exogenous variable,  w,  which accounts for the exogenous factors af- 
fecting the desired  excess of  private  income  over private spending, 
would rise immediately to offset any increase in g  and leave no room 
for government deficits to affect the aggregate level of desired spending. 
The present analysis, which excludes such an offsetting effect of private 
saving, implicitly assumes that general fiscal policy operates in the same 
way  as do shifts in  the desired  intertemporal  distribution  of private 
spending. This assumption would be entirely appropriate even under 
the conditions of Ricardian equivalence,  if the government always acted 
in the interests of its country’s private asset holders, with its budget 
deficits and surpluses reflecting private preferences regarding the in- 
tertemporal distribution of spending relative to income. 
2.6  Capital Controls and the Real Exchange Rate 
In the preceding analysis of the behavior of the real exchange rate, 
it has been assumed that private  agents can borrow and  lend in  the 
world  market  whatever amount they  want (denominated in terms of 
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controls policies a government may limit the extent of private credit 
flows and thereby  influence the behavior of  the real exchange rate. 
Specifically, looking back at the expression for the trade balance given 
in equation (7), T = v(z - q) =  -9,  it follows that any policy that 
affects -  tj  (the excess of domestic income over the value of domestic 
output) by controlling international capital flows must, for a given value 
of z, affect the level of q. 
Formally, there are a variety of ways in which capital controls can 
be introduced into the model used to determine the behavior of the 
real exchange rate. By far the simplest is to specify that the international 
flow of net private capital (the change in the net private stock of foreign 
securities) is controlled directly by the government during each period. 
The policy-determined  net outflow of capital (that is, the increase in 
private net holdings of  foreign assets) in period  t is denoted by a@). 
Returning to the base-case assumptions that government revenue is 
equal to government expenditure (g = 0) and that there is no outstand- 
ing government debt (G = 0), the condition for balance-of-payments 
equilibrium in  the  presence  of  capital controls  is  expressed  by  the 
requirement: 
(37)  u(z(~)  -  q(t))  + r*A(t)  = ~(t). 
Solving this condition for q(t),  it follows that the (logarithm of the) real 
exchange rate is given by: 
(38)  q(t) = z(t) + (l/v)[r*A(t) -  ~(t)]. 
It is apparent that a higher permissible capital outflow or a lower per- 
missible capital inflow in the current period (that is, a lower value of 
a[tl)  implies a lower current real exchange rate (a lower value of q[t]). 
But since greater current capital outflows or smaller current capital 
inflows mean larger future private net holdings of foreign assets (higher 
future values of A[s]  for s > t), a higher current value of  a(t)  implies 
lower future values of q(s)  for s > t. 
In considering the effects of capital controls on the real exchange 
rate, it is useful to distinguish between persistent effects on the level 
of  the real exchange rate and  effects on the  variability of  the real 
exchange rate in response to different types of economic disturbances. 
The capacity of capital controls to maintain a long-run average value 
of the real exchange rate different from the long-run average that would 
prevail in the absence of such controls is limited to the ability of such 
controls to maintain a long-run average value of A that differs from its 
long-run equilibrium value in the absence of controls. Specifically, com- 
paring the long-run average value of q determined by equation (38) 
(denoted by q, for the average with controls) with the long-run average 
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controls), under the assumption that the processes generating the z 
terms and the w terms are stationary, we find that: 
(39) 
where A, and A,  are the long-run average values of A with and without 
controls, respectively. This result reflects the fact that interest income 
earned on private net foreign asset holdings is spent partly on domestic 
goods, thereby implying that a higher long-run average level of private 
net foreign asset holdings requires a higher long-run average level of 
q to maintain equilibrium in the market for domestic goods. For relevant 
sizes of the parameters r* and u, it is apparent that for capital controls 
to have a substantial long-run effect on the average value of the real 
exchange rate, they must have a large effect on the long-run average 
level of private net holdings of foreign assets. 
In contrast to their limited capacity to affect the long-run average 
level of the real exchange rate, capital controls can substantially affect 
the responsiveness of the real exchange rate to temporary disturbances. 
Again, a comparison of equations (38) and (27) shows that under capital 
controls, with a fixed value of a(t),  the current value of q(t)  responds 
one-for-one with variations in z(t),  whereas in the absence of controls, 
q(t)  depends on the discounted present value of the current z and all 
expected future values of z.  It follows that a temporary, one-period 
disturbance to z(t)  will have a much stronger effect on q(t)  under capital 
controls (with a[t]  fixed) than in the absence of controls. This is because 
in the absence of controls the capital flow will adjust to accommodate 
part of the current disturbance to z(t)  and thereby spread the effect of 
the disturbance over time. More generally, this principle applies to any 
form of temporary disturbance to the value of z:  capital controls (with 
a fixed path of a[t])  tend to accentuate the effects of such disturbances 
on the real exchange rate. 
The other side of the coin is that capital controls reduce the sensitivity 
of the real exchange rate to disturbances in the values of w,  that is, to 
disturbances that affect the desired excess of income over spending. 
Equation (27) reveals that disturbances to w affect q(t)  in the absence 
of capital controls because q(t)  depends on &t), and &t)  depends on 
a  discounted  sum of  the present  and expected  future values  of  w. 
Looking at (38), however, we find that neither the current w nor any 
expected future value of w affects the current value of q(t).  Thus, capital 
controls, with a fixed value of  a(& insulate q(t)  from disturbances to 
the value of  w. 
There is no necessity, of  course, for capital controls to maintain a 
fixed value of a(t)  in the face of all forms of economic disturbances. 
In particular, if  a government wanted to stabilize the behavior of  the 
real  exchange rate (over and above the stability  resulting from  the 
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absence of capital controls), it would  seek to increase or reduce the 
value of a(t)  to offset positive or negative disturbances to z(t),  while 
holding a(t)  constant in the face of disturbances to the value of w. 
A special circumstance in  which  a government might  wish to ma- 
nipulate the international flow of capital is if it is pursuing other policies 
designed to affect the real exchange rate. In particular, consider the 
unexpected temporary shift of government spending toward domestic 
goods and away from foreign goods discussed at the beginning of sec- 
tion 2.5.  Because private asset holders anticipate declining values of 
q subsequent to the impact of this  spending shift, the rate at which 
they accumulate net foreign assets will increase in the absence of capital 
controls. Later on, especially after period  c  + T when the spending 
shift ends, the increase in private net holdings of foreign assets main- 
tains 4 at a level somewhat higher than it would otherwise be. But in 
period t and in the periods immediately following, the increase in pri- 
vate saving diminishes the effect of the spending shift in  raising the 
relative price of domestic goods. If the government wished to maximize 
the effect of the spending shift in raising 4(c), it would limit the extent 
of the capital outflow (the purchase of foreign assets by domestic res- 
idents) in  order to bottle  up the effect of the spending shift toward 
domestic goods. A similar capital controls policy would also be pursued 
by a government  that wished to maximize the effect on the real  ex- 
change rate of the unexpected temporary fiscal expansion discussed at 
the end of section 2.5. 
Much of this analysis of capital controls carries over to the analysis 
of exchange rate systems in which governments maintain two separate 
nominal exchange rates: one for current-account transactions, and one 
for capital-account  transactions. (See Dornbusch 1984 and the refer- 
ences cited there for an analysis of these systems.) Dual exchange rate 
systems are usually designed so that the current-account rate is fixed 
or determined by a crawling peg, while the capital-account rate is al- 
lowed to be determined by market forces. The effect, indeed the pur- 
pose, of such a system is to control the extent of private international 
capital flows, with the differential between the capital-account and the 
current-account exchange rates measuring the effective rationing price 
of  whatever net amount of foreign exchange is  allowed  to become 
available for financing private capital flows. 
2.7  The Combined Effects of Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy 
An especially important mechanism through which economic policies 
affect the real exchange rate and thereby replicate some of the effects 
of commercial policies is through the interaction of monetary policies 
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lyze the implications of this combination of policies, it is necessary to 
broaden  the model introduced in the earlier  sections by  introducing 
appropriate monetary  elements.  The condition for equilibrium in the 
domestic money market is expressed by the requirement: 
(40)  m = k  + p* + e  + fq  - ED’(e), 
where m denotes the logarithm of the nominal money supply; k sum- 
marizes the exogenous factors affecting the logarithm of the demand 
for domestic money; e denotes the logarithm of the nominal exchange 
rate (defined as the price of a unit of world money in terms of domestic 
money); p* denotes the logarithm of the world money price of traded 
goods; 1 > 0 is  the elasticity of  money  demand with  respect to the 
relative  price of domestic goods:  and  > 0 is  the semielasticity of 
money  demand with  respect  to the expected rate of  change in  the 
nominal exchange rate. The unitary coefficients on p’ and e in (40) are 
justified by the assumption that the demand for domestic money is unit 
elastic with respect to the general level of domestic prices. The positive 
coefficient of q in (40) reflects the effect of increases in q in raising the 
demand for domestic money, both by raising the general level of do- 
mestic prices (given p* and e)  and by increasing the real value of do- 
mestic output measured in terms of traded goods. The negative coef- 
ficient of De(e)  in (40) reflects the negative effect on domestic money 
demand of an increase in the domestic nominal interest rate that results 
from an increase in the expected depreciation  rate of the foreign ex- 
change value of domestic money. 
When the nominal exchange rate is freely flexible, and when goods 
prices adjust instantaneously to maintain equilibrium in the goods mar- 
kets, monetary  policy exerts no influence on the real exchange rate, 
q, or on any other variable in  the real  sector of the economy.  (See 
Mussa  1984 for further discussion.) This conclusion  is based on the 
assumption that the behavioral equations and equilibrium  conditions 
for the real sector of the economy that were described and analyzed 
in  the preceding sections of this paper require no modification to ac- 
commodate the condition of domestic money market equilibrium given 
in equation (40). Specifically, this means that we abstract from any real 
balance effect through which the real value of domestic money balances 
might affect the desired excess of domestic real spending over domestic 
real income. We also assume that under a freely flexible exchange rate, 
the real sector of the economy is not affected by the fiscal effects of 
money  creation  and destruction. The revenue that  the government 
derives from money creation is redistributed to the private sector through 
lump-sum transfers. The private sector then uses these transfers to pay 
the inflation tax on its real money balances that results from domestic 
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on domestic and foreign goods is therefore assumed to be unaffected 
by the fiscal effects of money creation under a flexible exchange rate. 
Given  the  conclusion  that the real  sector of  the economy is not 
affected by monetary policy under a flexible exchange rate, the money 
market equilibrium condition of equation (40) may be used to determine 
the behavior of the nominal exchange rate, treating the behavior of the 
money supply and of the determinants of money demand as exogenous. 
Specifically, treating (40) as a forward-looking difference equation in 
the expected level of e (and ruling out “bubbles”  in the solution), it 
follows that: 
where $ = (/(I  + (),  and K(U)  = k(u) + p*(u) + /q(u). This result, 
which is familiar from monetary models of exchange rate determination 
(see Mussa 1976; 1982a; 1982b; or 1984), states that the (logarithm of 
the) expected nominal exchange rate is a discounted sum of expected 
present and future differences between the (logarithm of the) nominal 
money supply and the (logarithm of the) component of money demand 
that does not depend on the exchange rate. Included in this component 
of money demand is the influence of the behavior of  the (logarithm of 
the) relative  price of domestic goods, which is determined indepen- 
dently of the behavior of the domestic money supply. 
The real exchange rate and other real sector variables are not influ- 
enced by the behavior of the money supply or by the nominal exchange 
rate under a flexible exchange rate regime because under this regime 
the nominal exchange rate always adjusts to offset variations in the 
money supply and preserve monetary neutrality. This neutrality breaks 
down, even in the absence of real balance  effects or nominal price 
stickiness, when the exchange rate is not freely flexible. To  see why 
this is so and how monetary policy and nominal exchange rate policy 
may interact to influence the real exchange rate, it is useful to consider 
the specific case in which the (logarithm of the) money supply is held 
constant at m and the (logarithm of the) nominal exchange rate is pegged 
at F. A similar analysis applies to the case in which the rate of money 
supply growth is held constant and the rate of change in the nominal 
exchange rate is fixed by some predetermined rate of crawl. 
With e pegged at e and m fixed at  vfz, and if  private asset holders 
expect no change in the nominal exchange rate (so that De[e] = 0), 
the only variable that is free to adjust to satisfy the money market 
equilibrium in equation (40) is the (logarithm of the) real exchange rate. 
Specifically, the value of q that is consistent with (40) is given by: 
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This relationship  indicates that for any given value of  k and p',  the 
greater the level of  m, the greater the level of  q required to maintain 
money market equilibrium; and the greater the level of  2, the lower 
the level of q required to maintain money market equilibrium. It follows 
that with a pegged exchange rate, the real exchange rate is not inde- 
pendent of the policy-determined level of the money supply; and with 
a policy-determined level of  the money supply, the real exchange rate 
is not independent of the policy-determined value of  the nominal ex- 
change rate. 
To  maintain e at d and simultaneously keep m at m, the government 
of  the home country will generally need to intervene in  the foreign 
exchange market and sterilize the effects of its interventions on the 
domestic money supply. Analytically, it is simplest to deal with such 
sterilized intervention by assuming that the government keeps the do- 
mestic credit component of the money supply constant and finances 
necessary interventions in the foreign exchange market by borrowing 
and lending on the world capital market. The required extent of gov- 
ernment borrowing is determined by the balance-of-payments equilib- 
rium condition: 
(43)  V(Z - 4)  + r*(A - C)  = w - aUD"(q) - pA -  g, 
where G represents the outstanding stock of government debt, and g 
represents the flow of government borrowing to finance intervention. 
Interest in G is assumed to be financed by lump-sum taxes. 
The flow of  government intervention is represented  by  the same 
variable, g, as was previously used to denote the excess of government 
spending over government revenue. This specification is appropriate 
because when the government borrows in the world capital market to 
finance its foreign exchange intervention, it is necessarily financing an 
excess of spending over revenue. This is the fiscal effect of sterilized 
intervention in the foreign exchange market. Specifically, if government 
spending on goods and services is constant (as will be assumed through- 
out this discussion), there must be a reduction in lump-sum taxes to 
correspond  to government borrowing  to finance intervention in the 
support of the foreign exchange value of  domestic money; and there 
must be an increase in lump-sum taxes to correspond to the government 
lending (or repayment of past borrowings) that occurs when the gov- 
ernment intervenes to prevent  appreciation of the foreign exchange 
value of domestic money. 
The fiscal effect of  foreign exchange market intervention has im- 
portant implications for the spending behavior of  the private sector. If 
the government must intervene to support the foreign exchange value 
of  domestic  money,  the  domestic  money  market  is  in  "quasi- 
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domestic money is equal to the current supply, but domestic money 
holders wish to run down their money balance over time. This running 
down of money balances over time implies an incipient excess of private 
sector spending over private sector income that private agents plan to 
finance at the expense of money holdings, without any effect on the 
rate of change in the net foreign asset holdings of  the private sector. 
Under a flexible exchange rate, this incipient excess of private spending 
over private income financed out of money balances would not emerge 
because the exchange rate would adjust to the level at which the stock 
of money is willingly held, and the planned rate of money accumulation 
corresponds to the expected rate of monetary expansion (both of which 
are zero when m is held constant at fi).  When the exchange rate is 
pegged at a value that necessitates intervention in support of the foreign 
exchange value  of  domestic money,  the incipient  excess of  private 
sector spending over income corresponding to the planned rate of re- 
duction in money balances is offset by the reduction in lump-sum taxes 
associated with the fiscal effect of government intervention in the for- 
eign exchange market. This result must be so because with sterilized 
intervention,  the actual level of  domestic money balances  does not 
decline, implying that the private sector does not succeed in spending 
in  excess of its actual income (taking account of  reduced lump-sum 
taxes) at the expense of its money balances. The actual excess of private 
sector spending over private sector income therefore corresponds to 
the  desired rate  of  decumulation of  private  net  holdings of foreign 
assets, -D(A) = -  w + aaDe(q)  + PA,  which is determined by exactly 
the same factors as those analyzed in the earlier sections of this paper. 
It should be emphasized that this analysis of the interaction between 
private sector spending behavior and the fiscal effect of  sterilized in- 
tervention in the foreign exchange market does not rely on a traditional 
real balance effect, in which the level of real money balances influences 
the desired level of  private  spending.  With a given nominal money 
supply, incipient differences  between  spending and income  that  the 
private sector plans to finance out of money balances arise only when 
the government pegs the nominal exchange rate at a value different 
from that which would prevail under a flexible exchange rate regime. 
On the other hand, it should also be emphasized that the analysis of 
this interaction does rely on the assumption that the private sector fails 
to foresee  the effect  of  current  government borrowing  and  lending 
(carried out in support of foreign exchange market intervention) on the 
future tax liabilities of the private sector. If there were a full Ricardian 
offset of private sector saving for government borrowing, there would 
be no mechanism through which the flow to government borrowing or 
the stock of government debt would influence the real sector of the 
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present model) for a policy of sterilized intervention to maintain the 
real exchange rate at the level determined by equation (42) if the pegged 
value of the nominal exchange rate differs from the nominal exchange 
rate that would prevail under exchange rate flexibility. (In a portfolio 
balance  model in which asset holders  have distinct demands for se- 
curities denominated  in different national monies, however, there is 
some latitude for sterilized intervention to affect the exchange rate; 
see for example, Kenen 1981 and Henderson 1984.) 
If  the conditions  for the fiscal effect  of  sterilized  intervention to 
influence the real exchange rate are assumed to be satisfied, the be- 
havior of the real exchange rate becomes sensitive to monetary policy 
and exchange rate policy. Specifically, a fixed nominal money supply, 
m, and a fixed nominal exchange rate,  2, maintained by a policy of 
sterilized intervention, determine the level of the real exchange rate 
through the relationship in equation (42). Given this value of the real 
exchange rate, the balance-of-payments equilibrium condition (43) de- 
termines the extent of official intervention (financed by  government 
borrowing in the world capital market) that is required to maintain this 
value of the real exchange rate, such that: 
(44) 
+ (v/l>[fi  - 2 -  p* -  k  + €JF(e)]. 
Since D(G) = g, and under the assumption that no change is expected 
in the nominal exchange rate or in the real exchange rate, the dynamic 
law governing the evolution of the stock of government debt is given 
by: 
(45) 
The dynamic law governing the evolution of the stock of privately held 
foreign assets (again under the assumption of no expected change in 
q) is given by: 
g  = r*G - (r* + p)A - auDe(q)  + w -  uz 
D(G) = r'G  -  (r* + p)A  + w -  vz 
+ (dl>(m -  d -  p* - k). 
(46)  D(A) = w - pA. 
Together, (45) and (46) constitute the dynamic system that determines 
the joint evolution of G and A with a fixed money supply and a pegged 
nominal exchange rate, under the assumption that no change is ex- 
pected in either the nominal or the real exchange rate. 
This dynamic system has two characteristic roots: a stable one, A, 
=  -p < 0; and an unstable one, A,  = r*. The stable characteristic 
root is associated with the dynamic process that governs the evolution 
of the private stock of  net foreign assets. With a fixed value of the 
forcing variable, w,  which measures exogenous influences on private 
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essarily converges to a long-run equilibrium level of w/p.. The unstable 
characteristic root is associated with the dynamic process governing 
the evolution of the stock of government debt. With fixed values of 
the forcing variables,  w, z, p*,  and  k  and of  the policy-determined 
variables, fi  and 6, there is for each initial stock of private net foreign 
assets a unique initial stock of government debt for which the subse- 
quent stock of government debt converges to a finite steady-state level. 
Specifically, if A is initially at its long-run equilibrium level, w/k,  the 
stock of government debt must be: 
(47) 
where q is given by equation (42). At this level of G, and only at this 
level of G,  the flow of government intervention required to maintain 
the pegged nominal exchange rate and the fixed nominal money supply 
will be zero, implying that the outstanding stock of government debt 
will not be changing. If G > G (with A  = w/p.), the required flow of 
intervention will be positive, implying an explosively expanding stock 
of government debt. If G < G (with A  = w/p.), the required flow of 
intervention will be negative, implying an explosively contracting stock 
of government debt (or explosively  expanding  stock of government 
lending). 
This dynamic instability in the behavior of the stock of government 
debt applies for any assumed behavior of the exogenous forcing vari- 
ables. It reflects the fundamental economic instability of a policy that 
seeks to maintain a constant nominal exchange rate  and a constant 
nominal money stock by means of sterilized intervention. For any path 
of the exogenous forcing variables z,  w, p*’  and k, and for any policy- 
determined value of m, there is only one fixed value of  e that can be 
sustained by sterilized intervention (with a finite bound on government 
borrowing and lending). In general, therefore,  a policy of  fixing the 
nominal money supply and pegging the nominal exchange rate is not 
viable and cannot permanently  sustain an arbitrary value of the real 
exchange rate. 
Rationality  of  expectations  presumably  implies that  private asset 
holders recognize the long-run nonviability of  a policy that fixes the 
nominal money supply and pegs the nominal exchange rate. If  a gov- 
ernment must persistently intervene to support the foreign exchange 
value of domestic money, private agents will suspect that at some point 
the money supply will need to be contracted or domestic money will 
need to be devalued (an increase in 6). Conversely, if  a government 
must persistently intervene to prevent appreciation of  the foreign ex- 
change value of  domestic money, private agents will suspect either a 
money supply increase or an exchange rate appreciation (a reduction 
in 6). For purposes of the present discussion of the real exchange rate, 
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it is useful to focus on the case of persistent intervention in support of 
the foreign exchange value of domestic money, whereby adjustment is 
expected to come through a nominal exchange rate  devaluation (an 
increase in 2). This case has been a common pattern of economic policy 
in a number of developing countries. 
It is possible to model expectations of a devaluation in several ways, 
each of which will yield somewhat different implications. The approach 
adopted here will be to assume that expectations of a devaluation are 
based, at least in  part, on the cumulative extent of past intervention 
in support of the current nominal exchange rate. Specifically, assuming 
that G was zero when the current exchange rate was established, sup- 
pose  that G must reach  some critical level, G, before private asset 
holders begin to expect any significant probability of a parity change 
in the near future. This implies that Dp(e)  = 0, so long as G < G. It 
follows that so long as G < G, q will be determined by equation (42). 
Thus, so long as cumulative  intervention in  support of  the current 
nominal exchange rate remains below the critical level, G, the real 
exchange rate will be at the level dictated by money market equilibrium 
for the policy-determined values of  m and t.  Under this assumption 
about expectations of devaluation, the combination of monetary policy 
and nominal exchange rate policy therefore has the capacity to influence 
the real exchange rate, at least over some finite time period. 
When G rises above G,  the expected rate of devaluation is assumed 
to be given by: 
(48)  P(e)  = P(G - GI. 
The factor p reflects both the expected probability of devaluation (dur- 
ing the next brief time interval) and the expected extent of devaluation 
if  a parity change occurs (during this brief interval). Given this as- 
sumption about P(e),  the level of q consistent with  money  market 
equilibrium is still given by equation (42) when G < G, whereas when 
G > G, the level of q is given by: 
(49)  q  = (l/f)[m - t -  p* - k  + Ep(G - GI]. 
When G < G, the expected rate of change in q,  De(q),  is zero. When 
G > G, the expected rate of change in q is given by: 
(50)  D'(q)  = -4G -  + (Sp/l)[D(G)l, 
where E = (1 + e)(p/f)  > 0, and D(G) = g is the flow of intervention 
when no devaluation takes place. This result reflects the assumption 
that if  a devaluation occurs during the next brief time interval, the 
expectation of  a further devaluation during the following brief time 
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With these assumptions, it follows that during the period between 
devaluations, when G < G, q is constant at the level q determined by 
(42), and the evolution  of  A  and G are determined by  the dynamic 
system of  (45) and (46). The comments previously  made about this 
dynamic system apply here as well, except for the fact that in this case, 
the intervention tends to support the foreign exchange value of do- 
mestic money, and G is generally growing over time.When G reaches 
G and before the devaluation actually occurs, q is determined by (49) 
and the evolution of A and G are determined by the dynamic system: 
(51)  D(A) = w - pA  + ~uE(G  - G) - (a~(p/l)[D(G)] 
(52)  D(G) = r*G - (r* + k)A + w -  vz + am(G - G) 
- (a~@/l)[D(G)l  + (d/)[~  -  P -  p* - k  + (p(G - G)]. 
This dynamic system has one negative characteristic root, h, > -  p, 
and one positive characteristic root, h2 > r*.  As in the previous case, 
the negative root is associated with the process of convergence of the 
private stock of net foreign assets toward its steady-state level; and 
the positive root is associated with the explosive behavior of the stock 
of government debt. The fact that the positive  characteristic root is 
now greater than its previous value of r* indicates that private agents' 
anticipation of a devaluation contributes to the explosive tendency of 
the dynamic system. The economic explanation of  this result is the 
following. As private agents come to expect a significant probability 
of a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate, the domestic nominal 
interest rate must rise and the demand for domestic money must de- 
cline. To offset this factor tending to reduce the demand for domestic 
money and thus maintain money market equilibrium, q must rise. This 
rise in  q implies an increase in  the flow of  intervention required  to 
maintain the nominal exchange rate and the nominal money supply and 
sustain balance-of-payments  equilibrium. In turn, this larger flow of 
intervention accelerates the growth of the outstanding stock of gov- 
ernment debt and thereby further accelerates the explosive tendency 
of  the dynamic system. Moreover, as De(e)  rises as the result of  in- 
creases in the assessed probability of devaluation and in the expected 
magnitude of devaluation, private agents no longer expect a zero rate 
of change in the real exchange rate. Initially, when G is near G, D'(q) 
is negative because the expected effect of the growth of G (conditional 
on no devaluation), ((p/l)[D(G)],  outweighs the expected effect of de- 
valuation (conditional on its occurrence), -  E(G - G). This initial neg- 
ative value of D"(q)  tends to reduce the extent of intervention required 
to maintain balance-of-payments  equilibrium and partially offsets the 
acceleration of the growth of G induced by the higher level of q. Later, 
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become yet another factor contributing to the explosive tendency of 
the dynamic system. 
The behavior  of  the real exchange rate  and the nominal and real 
interest rates in  this dynamic process  are as follows.  So long as G 
remains below G, q is constant at the level determined by equation 
(42), which is above the value that q would have if the nominal exchange 
rate was not sustained by intervention in support of the pegged foreign 
exchange value of domestic money. Indeed, as shown in section 2.2, 
the excess of spending over income that is financed by the fiscal effect 
of intervention in the foreign exchange market may be thought of as 
the proximate cause of the higher level of q. Since De(e)  = 0 and De(q) 
= 0 while G remains  below  G, the  domestic nominal interest  rate 
remains  at the level of  the world  nominal interest  rate,  i*,  and the 
domestic real interest rate remains at the level of the world real interest 
rate, r*.  As G rises above G, the level of q determined by equation (49) 
is forced higher and higher by rising assessments of the probability and 
likely extent of devaluation, as summarized by the increasing value of 
D(e)  = p(G - G). As D(e)  rises, the domestic nominal interest rate 
rises further and further above the world nominal interest rate. 
The domestic real interest rate follows a somewhat different pattern. 
When G initially rises just above G, the expected real domestic interest 
rate, r  =  r* - uDe(q),  falls below  r* because the positive  effect of 
expected growth in  G (conditional on no devaluation) on De(q),  ((pll) 
[D(G)],  outweighs the negative effect associated with the expectation 
of devaluation,  -E(G - G). Later on, the factor -E(G - G) tending 
to  induce  a  negative  value  of  De(q) outweighs  the  positive  factor 
((pll)[D(G)]  tending to induce a positive value of De(q),  and De(q)  be- 
comes negative.  At  this point  the domestic real interest  rate, r* - 
[uDe(q)],  rises above the world real interest rate, r*,  and it continues 
to rise until the moment of devaluation. 
The general features of this description of real exchange rate behavior 
and domestic nominal and real interest rate behavior apply under a 
broader range of  assumptions about the conduct of  monetary policy 
and exchange rate policy. Specifically, consider a policy under which 
the nominal exchange rate is depreciated at a predetermined rate of 
crawl, supplemented by occasional major devaluations, and the money 
supply is made to grow at a rate greater than the growth in the demand 
for money at the predetermined rate of  crawl of  the exchange rate. 
Suppose that when major devaluations occur under this general policy 
regime, they are of  sufficient magnitude that for some time afterward 
private agents do not expect another major devaluation. Also suppose 
that the extent of  the major devaluation is such that for some time 
afterward there is a balance-of-payments surplus (on an official settle- 
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the intervention in support of the exchange rate prior to the last major 
devaluation. Under these assumptions, the path of the real exchange 
rate and of other relevant variables will be something like the following. 
In the initial period  following a major devaluation,  during which 
private agents do not predict another immediate major devaluation, the 
level of q is determined by the money market equilibrium condition to 
be: 
(53)  q = (I/l)(rn -  e -  p* -  k), 
where m and e are the policy-determined (but not constant) values of 
the (logarithm of the) money supply and the (logarithm of the) price of 
foreign exchange; and, for simplicity, p*  and k are assumed constant. 
By assumption, the rate of growth of the money supply, D(m),  is greater 
than the rate of  crawl of the nominal exchange rate, D(e). Thus, the 
level of q determined by (53) will be rising over time at the rate: 
(54) 
The extent of  the major devaluation is assumed to be such that the 
level of  q for some period after the devaluation is consistent with an 
official settlements surplus, the magnitude of which is given by: 
(55) 
+ (u/l)(rn - e -  p* -  k). 
The dynamic behavior of the private stock of net foreign assets during 
this period is given by: 
(56)  D(A) = w - pA - (au/O[D(rn)  - D(e)l. 
Assuming that private asset holders correctly anticipate the increase 
in 4 determined by (54),  the domestic real interest rate, r* - aDp(4), 
remains below the world real interest rate during this period. 
With the passage of time, the level of q determined by (53) rises 
sufficiently that the official settlements balance shifts from surplus to 
deficit. The repayment of government debt during the period of surplus, 
however, is assumed to restore confidence that there will not be an 
immediate major devaluation. Accordingly, the level of 4, its rate of 
change,  the  extent  of  intervention  required  to maintain  balance-of- 
payments equilibrium, and the rate of change in private net holdings 
of foreign assets continue to be determined by (53) through (56).  When 
the cumulative effect of official settlements deficits pushes government 
borrowings above the critical level G at which private agents begin to 
suspect a significant probability of a major devaluation, these equations 
need to be modified along the lines previously discussed. The rate of 
increase in  q is accelerated by rising expectations of  the probability 
and likely magnitude of a major devaluation. The ex ante domestic real 
interest rate, r = r* - uDp(q)  initially declines relative to the value it 
D(q) = (1/"h)  - me)]. 
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would have in the absence of anticipations of a major devaluation, but 
later r rises as G rises significantly above G. The official settlements 
deficit and the rate of government borrowing to finance this deficit rise 
more rapidly as a consequence of anticipations of a major devaluation, 
thereby contributing to the explosive tendency of the dynamic system. 
When the major devaluation occurs, the nominal price of foreign 
exchange (an increase in e)  jumps up, and the real exchange rate (a 
reduction in q)  jumps down. Subsequently, the just-described patterns 
of  behavior of the real exchange rate, the domestic real interest rate, 
and the official settlements balance all repeat themselves until the next 
major devaluation. 
Alternative assumptions about the conduct of monetary policy and 
exchange rate policy will  yield different conclusions concerning the 
behavior of  the real exchange rate and other related variables. Given 
the general purpose of this paper, the important general conclusion of 
this analysis is that the combination of a policy that controls the nominal 
money supply and a policy that controls the nominal exchange rate, 
supported by a policy of  official intervention in the foreign exchange 
market, has some capacity to influence the behavior  of  the real ex- 
change rate and other real economic variables.  This capacity arises 
from two sources. First, the policy combination inevitably influences 
the behavior of the real value of the money supply, and this behavior 
should be expected to influence the behavior of other real variables, 
including the real exchange rate. Second, so long as the private sector 
does not adjust its spending relative to its income to offset fully the 
debt-financed difference  between  government spending and govern- 
ment revenue, the fiscal effect of sterilized intervention in the foreign 
exchange market will affect the aggregate difference between spending 
and income for the economy as a whole. It is through this channel that 
the intervention will affect the relative prices that sustain equilibrium 
in the goods markets. For this effect to be present, it is not essential 
that  private  asset holders  totally  disregard  the  future  tax  liabilities 
implicit in the current flow of government borrowing. But it is essential 
that they not reduce their own  spending relative  to their income to 
offset fully the government borrowing used to finance the intervention 
in the foreign exchange market. Of  course, in order for this effect to 
be substantial, the flow of borrowing to finance the intervention must 
be large, and the offset of private sector spending in response to gov- 
ernment borrowing must not be too great. 
2.8  Conclusion 
This paper has developed a general analytical framework that may 
be used  to analyze how a variety  of government policies and other 
exogenous disturbances can affect the real exchange rate and thereby 82  Michael Mussa 
influence the allocation of resources in ways similar to the effects of 
commercial policy. Two broad classes of government policies and ex- 
ogenous disturbances can have such effects: policies and disturbances 
that affect  the distribution  of  domestic spending  between  domestic 
goods and foreign (or traded) goods; and policies and disturbances that 
affect the level of domestic spending relative to domestic income. In 
some cases, the effects of  such policies and disturbances on the real 
exchange rate and on the allocation of resources may be quite trans- 
parent, as is the case, for instance, when a government shifts its own 
spending from purchasing military equipment in the world arms market 
to pursuing domestic development projects that employ primarily do- 
mestic labor. In other cases, the mechanisms through which the real 
exchange rate is affected may be more obscure. They may be obscure, 
for example, in the case of capital controls that depress the relative 
price of domestic goods in terms of foreign goods by limiting the excess 
of domestic spending over domestic income that can be financed  by 
an inflow of foreign capital. Another example is the case of a combined 
policy of pegging the path of the nominal exchange rate and fixing the 
path  of the domestic nominal  money  supply, whereby the excess of 
government spending over government revenue appears under the guise 
of  reserve losses  or official foreign  borrowing  to support sterilized 
intervention in the foreign exchange market. 
The model developed  in this paper has essentially the same static 
structure as the two basic models that have traditionally been applied 
in  the theory of  international  trade and in analyses of the effects of 
commercial  policies.  These  are  the  standard  two-country,  two- 
commodity model summarized by  Mundell (1968) and the dependent 
economy model of Salter (1959) and Swan (1960). The key innovation 
of the present analysis is that these models are made dynamic by taking 
account both of changes in net foreign asset positions caused by current- 
account imbalances and of the effects of changes in net asset positions 
and anticipated changes in relative prices on the relationship between 
spending and income. This innovation  allows an analysis of policies 
and disturbances the effects of which cannot be fully appreciated within 
the context of a wholly static model. It permits analysis of, for example, 
temporary changes in commercial policies  or changes in commercial 
policies that are anticipated to occur at a future date. It also allows us 
to examine temporary or anticipated future changes in either the level 
or the distribution of government spending, of capital controls, and of 
nonsustainable policies that fix, for some period of time, both the path 
of the nominal exchange rate and the path of the nominal money supply. 
Finally, it is worthwhile emphasizing that the analytical framework 
developed in this paper can be applied  to a wider set of issues than 
those examined  here. For example, it  is  often  suggested that some 83  Commercial, Fiscal, Monetary, and Exchange Rate Policies 
Latin American countries suffered severe economic disturbances in the 
late 1970s and early  1980s, first, as a consequence of a sudden influx 
of foreign capital and, then, from an even more sudden curtailment of 
their  capacity  to borrow in  the world  capital  market. This  type of 
disturbance can easily be analyzed in the framework developed in this 
paper by  specifying an appropriate path for the actual and expected 
evolution  of  the exogenous forcing variable,  w,  that influences the 
difference between income and spending. The influx of foreign capital 
would be represented by a downward shift in the actual and expected 
future values of w,  which implies an increase in the real exchange rate 
(the relative price of domestic goods in terms of foreign goods) and a 
current-account deficit financed by the inflow of foreign capital. The 
sudden, unanticipated  curtailment  of  access to foreign  credit  corre- 
sponds to an upward shift in  the actual and expected future value of 
w to above the level it had before the influx of foreign credit. This shift 
induces a decline in the real exchange rate to below its level prior to 
the influx of foreign credit and an improvement in the trade balance of 
sufficient magnitude to allow  the country to pay  the interest on its 
expanded stock of foreign debt. The analysis carried out in this paper 
would  suggest that a policy limiting international capital flows would 
reduce the sensitivity of the real exchange rate to this type of disturb- 
ance. The present framework is capable of analyzing any other form 
of disturbance that can be described as an alteration in the actual and 
expected time paths of either the exogenous variable that affects the 
desired distribution of spending or the exogenous variable that affects 
the relationship between  spending and income. 
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Comment  Jeffrey A. Frankel 
Mussa’s paper is a masterful tour de force. Armed with a clean log- 
linear model and his usual clear expository style, Mussa sets out to 
conquer a veritable universe of  macroeconomic questions. He exam- 
ines the effects of shifts in the composition of government spending, 
tax cuts, capital controls, and some combinations of monetary policy 
and exchange rate policy, including a crawl with occasional major de- 
valuations.  Throughout  he  keeps track not only of  the accumulating 
stock of foreign assets, as Pentti Kouri did in his classic exchange rate 
model, but also of the interest rate, interest payments in the interna- 
tional service account, the accumulating stock of government debt, and 
government interest payments. Furthermore, he also assumes perfect 
foresight and distinguishes between temporary and permanent policy 
changes. 
My only reservations about the paper concern truth in advertising. 
First, the term real exchange rate is somewhat misleading because it 
is used for the price of domestic goods in terms of traded goods (q), 
whereas the more common usage is the inverse of this. Second, the 
terms traded good and domestic good are themselves misleading be- 
cause both goods are in fact internationally traded, as I understand it. 
They should instead be called the “importable” and the “exportable” 
goods. 
Third, it could be considered misleading to call the country under 
analysis  “medium  sized” instead  of  “large.”  The country produces 
some of each good, whereas the rest of the world produces only one, 
the importable good. There is therefore one sense  in which the domestic 
country is bigger than the rest of the countries in the world. Finally, 
it is also misleading to present this paper at a conference on “Structural 
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Adjustment  and the Real  Exchange Rate in  Developing Countries” 
because the model has little to do with LDCs. Aside from the fact that 
the country in question is not a minor participant in the goods markets, 
it is a country with  sufficiently developed financial markets that the 
government practices sterilized foreign exchange intervention and that 
the effect of a fiscal expansion  is to cause a real appreciation  of the 
currency. This characterization  sounds more like the United States than 
Brazil. 
I cannot resist recalling what they say about the Holy Roman Empire: 
It wasn’t holy, it wasn’t Roman, and it wasn’t an empire. 
My complaint that the paper is not particularly relevant to developing 
countries applies equally to several of the other papers presented here. 
We  hear hardly  anything  about the international  debt situation, for 
example. These are countries with  serious problems-problems  that 
have  serious economic and  political  implications for the citizens  of 
these countries and that are of serious intellectual interest for econo- 
mists worldwide. To address these problems, we who in the past have 
worked primarily on the macroeconomics of the industrialized coun- 
tries must do more than simply change the name of one of our jump 
variables. 
Comment  Kathie L. Krumm 
In  his  very  comprehensive paper,  Mussa has examined  a  range  of 
macroeconomic policies that affect the real exchange rate in a manner 
similar to the effects of commercial policy. In defining the discussion 
of any policy  that affects  the real  exchange rate as equivalent  to a 
discussion  of  the exchange rate as a tool of commercial  policy,  the 
paper is perhaps too broad ranging and not sufficiently focused. 
Before returning to commercial policy and the topics I believe need 
more examination, I want to compliment the author on the integrated 
framework in which he has examined various policies. His handling of 
some of the dynamics is elegant, once I got used to the upside-down 
definition of  the real exchange rate. I found a number of the results 
interesting. The modeling of capital controls, for example, illustrated 
the ways in  which  the macro economy and the real  exchange rate 
respond  quite differently  to shocks in  the presence of such controls; 
and the model is rich enough to allow for various formulations of capital 
controls. Furthermore, the shift of government expenditures between 
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sectors is an interesting policy instrument to consider in theory, though 
it may not be a feasible instrument in practice, given the difficulties in 
identifying the degree of tradability of a sector, in integrating such an 
instrument into a budgeting framework, and in divorcing other sectoral 
concerns from the analysis. 
This leads to me reason why this paper may not be relevant to most 
commercial  policy  concerns.  Usually,  commercial  policy  is  not  de- 
signed to affect the general relative price level, or we would see more 
uniform  tariff  rates and more effective protection  rates. Instead, the 
policies are aimed at prices in particular sectors, either output prices 
or the prices of factors intensively used in a sector. If that is the case, 
it might be interesting to analyze which other macroeconomic policies 
have  similar sectoral effects, such as sector-specific government ex- 
penditures, be they temporary or permanent, and capital controls fa- 
voring certain sectors. Another limitation of  the paper for evaluating 
the role  of the exchange rate as a tool of  commercial  policy  is  the 
absence of some framework for welfare analysis. For example, since 
both policies affect the real exchange rate in the same direction, when 
should the government shift expenditures to tradables rather than im- 
pose tariffs? 
This paper seems to be motivated mainly by the adverse effects an 
appreciated real exchange rate is claimed to have on international trade 
competitiveness  and employment, as  agpears to be the current situation 
in  the United States, for instance. Mussa states at the outset his as- 
sumption of full employment, making it difficult to address a general 
concern with  an appreciated real  exchange rate as long as this  has 
limited employment effects. 
Finally, it is not clear how this analysis incorporates any features of 
the economy that are viewed as more critical for poor countries than 
for richer countries. Mussa’s initial comment that governments often 
attempt to manipulate  the real exchange rate for commercial  policy 
purposes seems more relevant to developed than to developing coun- 
tries. Nonetheless, the clean framework presented in this paper dem- 
onstrates the importance of understanding the interdependent effects 
of macroeconomic policies in both developing and developed countries 
and could be used to handle a number of issues raised in the study of 
macroeconomic adjustment packages. 